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Abstract 
Using a sample of 2,186 credit default swap (CDS) spreads quoted in the European market during the period 
2002-2009, this paper empirically analyzes which model – accounting- or market-based – better explains 
corporate credit risk. We find that there is little difference in the explanatory power of the two approaches. 
Our results suggest that both accounting and market data complement one other and thus that a 
comprehensive model that includes both types of variables appears to be the best option for explaining credit 
risk. We also show that the explanatory power of accounting- and market-based variables for measuring 
credit risk is particularly strong during periods of high uncertainty, as experienced in the recent financial 
crisis, and that it decreases as the CDS contract matures. Finally, the comprehensive model continues to show 
the best results when using the credit rating as the proxy for credit risk, but accounting variables currently 
appear to have a more important role than the market variables. 
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EXAMINING WHAT BEST EXPLAINS CORPORATE CREDIT RISK: 
ACCOUNTING-BASED VERSUS MARKET-BASED MODELS 
 
1. Introduction 
Investors’ or potential lenders’ ability to correctly measure the credit risk of companies is 
an issue that has historically attracted attention in the financial literature. This desire to 
understand the determinants of default risk has regained its strength following Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008 and the 2011 European sovereign debt crisis. 
The use of credit risk models has been fully documented in the literature since 1966, 
when Beaver published his pioneering work, ‘Financial ratios as predictors of failure’ 
[Journal of Accounting Research], which served as a reference for subsequent 
investigations. This univariate model was followed by a multidimensional-type model that 
integrates all relevant variables that contribute to the success or failure of a company and 
provides a single diagnosis or overall assessment of their creditworthiness. The two best-
known multidimensional models of credit risk are Altman’s Z-score model (1968) and 
Ohlson’s O-score model (1980). These models have in common the use of information 
drawn from the financial statements of borrowers and consequently are called accounting-
based models. 
More recently, credit risk models have used data from the capital markets, in which 
the shares or bonds issued by the companies in question are traded. In theory, market 
prices reflect investors’ expectations about a firm’s future performance. As a result, these 
prices contain forward-looking information, which is ideally suited for calculating the 
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Among the models that use market data, we must highlight those based on Merton 
(1974), who introduced the original model that led to subsequent research on ‘structural 
models’.1 Relying on the contingent claims analysis of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton 
(1974) proposes considering the value of the equity as a call option on the value of the 
assets of the firm with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. From this 
perspective, the company will default if its asset value falls below a certain default 
boundary related to the company’s outstanding debt. However, Merton’s (1974) model 
presents some unrealistic assumptions. It considers that the liability structure of the firm 
consists only of a non-callable zero coupon bond and that bankruptcy cannot be triggered 
before maturity. In addition, this model supposes that the absolute priority rule always 
holds at maturity, meaning that equity holders can only obtain a positive payoff after debt 
holders are reimbursed completely.  
Many papers have extended Merton’s (1974) original model to incorporate more 
realistic assumptions. Black and Cox (1976) allow default to occur as soon as a firm’s asset 
value falls below a certain threshold (i.e., at any time). Geske (1977) uses the compound 
option technique to value a corporation’s risky coupon bonds. He considers that 
bankruptcy occurs when the value of assets is so low that equity holders no longer find it 
profitable to service debt. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and 
Perraudin (1997) propose a structural model that takes into account the possibility of debt 
renegotiation. A number of other papers have also made more sophisticated assumptions, 
including Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Fan and 
Sundaresan (2000) and Collin-Dufresne and Golstein (2001).  
                                                 
1 The company KMV, later integrated into Moody’s, is one of the great defenders of this type of model for 
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Another market-based approach for measuring credit risk refers to the so-called 
reduced-form models. Unlike structural models, where all relevant credit risk elements, 
including default, are functions of the structural characteristics of the firm (asset volatility 
and leverage primarily), reduced-form models do not condition default on these values. 
The reduced-form approach relies on the assumption that the credit event occurs at a 
completely inaccessible time and consists of modeling the conditional law of this random 
time. These models use the market prices of the firms’ defaultable securities to extract their 
default probabilities, relying on the market as the only source of information regarding the 
condition of the firms’ balance sheets. Significant studies on this topic include those of 
Litterman and Iben (1991), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1999).  
Our paper is closely related to recent studies that have investigated which of these 
two approaches – accounting-based or market-based – is more appropriate for explaining 
corporate credit risk. Accounting models have been criticized for the historic nature of the 
information they take as input and for not taking into account the volatility of a firm’s 
assets in estimating its risk of default (e.g., Vassalou and Xing, 2004).2 However, the 
inefficiencies of capital markets may lead to prediction errors in market-based models. 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) conclude that a measure based on the Black-Scholes-Merton option-
pricing model provides significantly more information than the two most popular 
accounting-based measures (Z-Score and O-Score). However, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) 
conclude that although there is little difference in the predictive ability of both models, the 
accounting-based model leads to greater bank profitability in terms of differential 
decisions’ error costs and competitive pricing regimes. Other studies report mixed results. 
Demirovic and Thomas (2007) find that although distance-to-default is the most significant 
                                                 
2 This assumption does not hold for Merton’s model, in which firms may have similar levels of equity and 
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variable in the measuring of corporate credit risk, market-based models perform better 
when accounting data are included. Tanthanongsakkun and Treepongkaruna (2008) and 
Das et al. (2009) reach similar conclusions. 
The financial literature has used a range of measures to proxy for credit risk. For 
example, studies have used as a measure of credit risk the company’s financial condition 
(i.e., bankrupt versus non-bankrupt firms) (e.g., Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Hillegeist et 
al., 2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), the credit rating assigned by an agency rating (e.g., 
Ang and Patel, 1975; Blume et al., 1998; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007), and the spreads of 
bonds issued by the firm and listed on a secondary market (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 
2001; Longstaff and Rajan, 2006; Wu and Zhang, 2008). However, more recently, the 
empirical literature on credit risk has focused on credit default swap (CDS) spreads (e.g., 
Alexander and Kaeck, 2008; Das et al., 2009; Ericcson et al. 2009; Forte and Peña, 2009).  
Credit default swaps are credit protection contracts whereby one party agrees to make 
a contingent payment in the case of a defined credit event in exchange for a periodic 
premium.3 For buyers of credit protection, the CDS market offers an opportunity to reduce 
credit concentration and regulatory capital while maintaining customer relationships. For 
sellers of protection, it offers the opportunity to take credit exposure over a customized 
term and earn income without having to fund the position (Packer and Suthiphongchai, 
2003).  
As Das et al. (2009) note, CDSs provide a viable alternative for measuring credit risk 
for several reasons. First, CDS spreads offer cross-sectional and time-series credit quality 
information. This continuous variable contrasts with studying binary data samples of 
                                                 
3
 The regular payment made by the CDS buyer to the CDS seller is expressed as a percentage (normally as 
basis points) of the contract’s notional value and is known as the CDS premium (or the CDS spread) 
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bankruptcies, where a company is identified as healthy until default occurs. Second, CDS 
spreads reflect market perceptions of default rather than those of a rating agency. Third, 
spreads capture both the default and recovery risk aspects of firm distress. Finally, CDS 
spreads are less susceptible than corporate bond spreads to liquidity and tax effects (Elton 
et al., 2001). Additionally, the ‘price’ of a CDS is normally quoted as a constant maturity 
spread, whereas bond spreads are calculated by subtracting an unknown risk-free interest 
rate from the bond yield and are not directly comparable when maturities of the underlying 
bonds differ (Alexander and Kaeck, 2008). 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate whether significant differences between 
accounting- and market-based approaches for measuring credit risk can be observed in the 
European market.4 Moreover, given the benefits identified in the literature, we have chosen 
to use CDS spreads as the best proxy for credit risk. Second, although most of the extant 
research stops at the onset of the recession, we consider an extended time span, from 2002 
to 2009, that includes both high-growth and economic crisis periods. Extending the 
analysis to include the crisis period enables us to test whether findings reported in previous 
papers are robust to changes in the economic cycle. Finally, this paper compares the results 
obtained when credit ratings are used instead of CDS spreads as a measure for 
creditworthiness. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology 
employed in the empirical research and defines the explanatory variables. Section 3 
presents and discusses the results obtained. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
                                                 
4 A notable exception includes Demirovic and Thomas (2007), who use a sample of UK-listed companies 
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2. Data and methodological aspects 
2.1. Sample 
Our sample comprises firms listed on the FTSEuroFirst 100 Index with information 
about CDS spreads available in the Markit database during the period 2002-2009.5 
Markit’s CDS data do not reflect any specific trading activity; they are post-trade valuation 
information drawn from numerous financial institutions, including inter-dealer brokers, 
electronic trading platforms, major market makers and many significant buy-side firms. 
The data set undergoes a rigorous cleaning process: stale, flat curves, outliers, and 
inconsistent data are discarded.6 
As is customary, firms operating in the financial sector are excluded from the 
analysis due to the different structure of their financial statements.7 Entities that present 
abnormal ratios or extreme values were also eliminated from the sample as outliers. After 
the completion of this filtering, the final sample consisted of 2,186 observations from 51 
unique firms in six different European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, and United Kingdom). Table 1 shows the number of observations that compose the 
sample by year and CDS maturity. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
As in similar studies, we used unconsolidated statements, thus preventing relevant 
differences in profit and loss statements and balance sheets of parent companies and 
                                                 
5 The FTSEurofirst 100 Index includes the 60 largest companies ranked by market capitalization in the FTSE 
Developed Europe Index and 40 additional European companies selected for their size and sector 
representation. See http://www.ftse.com for more details. 
6 See http://www.markit.com for a detailed description of the database.  
7 For an analysis of the relationship between market- and accounting-based variables in the banking industry, 
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subsidiaries from negating one other. We obtained the accounting data from the Amadeus 
database, and market information is taken from the Datastream database.8 
 
2.2. Definition of variables 
2.2.1. Dependent variable 
As previously stated, we use CDS spreads from the Markit database as the dependent 
variable. Although there exists a high concentration of CDS quotes at the five-year 
maturity, which led most studies dealing with corporate credit data to focus on this one 
specific maturity (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005), this approach only observes the credit risk 
effects for one single point on the term structure. Therefore, to provide more detailed 
insight, we include the whole maturity spectrum, from 1-year to 30-year maturities. We 
collect the CDS constant maturity spreads on a daily basis at the end of each year (average 
of the last 10 trading days) over the period 2002-2009. All contracts are on senior 
unsecured obligations with the modified-modified restructuring clause, which is common 
in Europe. 
Moreover, we regress the natural logarithm of CDS spreads on explanatory variables. 
As Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) note, regressions in the logarithm of spreads fit better than in 
the levels directly. 
In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics of CDS spread values by maturity 
and year. CDS premiums vary significantly by maturity, ranging on average from 71 bps 
for 1-year CDS contracts to 112 bps for 30-year contracts. We also see a downward trend 
in premiums from 2002 to 2006 for all maturities, reaching a minimum of 34 bps on 
average in 2006. In 2007, as a result of the onset of the financial crisis, there is a change in 
                                                 
8 See http://bvdinfo.com and http://online.thomsonreuters.com/datastream for detailed information about 
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the trend. The worsening of the global credit crisis in 2008 led, among others reasons, by 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers dramatically increased the CDS spreads by up to 298 bps 
on average. Although CDS premiums fell in 2009, they did not reach the levels prior to 
the start of the crisis. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
2.2.2. Independent variables 
Our aim is to analyze which data, accounting- or market-based, better explain 
borrowers’ CDS spreads.  
2.2.2.1 Accounting-based variables 
We use 10 accounting variables to proxy for (1) liquidity, (2) capital structure, (3) 
debt service, (4) cash flow generation, (5) performance (profitability), and (6) firm size. 
All of these variables have been widely used by previous studies as drivers of credit risk, 
and most are included in the two best-known accounting-based models of credit risk (i.e., 
the Z-score (Altman, 1968) and the O-score (Ohlson, 1980)). 
To proxy for financial liquidity, we use the ratio of current liabilities to current assets 
(CL/CA) and the ratio of working capital to total assets (WC/TA). The former is 
constructed by dividing current liabilities by current assets. One would expect that a larger 
ratio indicates lower liquidity. A company whose ratio exceeds unity may even have 
problems meeting its payments in the short term. We thus expect a positive relationship 
between the CL/CA ratio and the CDS premium. The working capital to total assets ratio is 
a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to total assets. Working capital is 
defined as the difference between current assets and current liabilities. In this case, we 
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We use the following two common ratios to analyze the effect of capital structure on 
the credit risk of companies: the ratio of retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA) and the 
debt-to-equity ratio (TL/Eq). Retained earnings refer to the account that reports the total 
amount of reinvested earnings and/or losses of a firm over its entire life. The age of a firm 
is implicitly considered in this ratio; a relatively young firm will likely show a low RE/TA 
ratio because it has not had time to build accumulated profit. The RE/TA ratio also 
measures the leverage of a firm. Firms with high RE, relative to TA, have financed their 
assets through the retention of profits and have not utilized as much debt. The TL/Eq ratio, 
also referred to as the debt-to-equity ratio, is another leverage ratio that compares a 
company's total liabilities to its total shareholders' equity.9 A higher percentage and a 
greater potential variability of earnings translate into a greater potential for default. 
Consequently, we predict opposite values for the coefficients of these ratios in the 
regression analysis, i.e., negative for the RE/TA ratio and positive for the TL/Eq ratio. 
Debt service is measured by the interest coverage ratio, i.e., earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) divided by total interest payments. This ratio is used to determine how 
easily a company can pay interest on outstanding debt. Similar to Blume et al. (1998), we 
transform the interest coverage ratio in two ways. First, we set any interest coverage ratio 
to zero if it is negative. Second, any interest coverage ratio that exceeds 100 is censored on 
the assumption that further increases in value convey no additional information. A lower 
ratio indicates a greater degree to which a company is burdened by debt expense. When a 
company’s interest coverage ratio is 1.5 or lower, its ability to meet interest expenses may 
be questionable. We thus expect a negative relationship between the interest coverage ratio 
and credit risk.  
                                                 
9 We decide to use the debt-to-equity ratio instead of the debt ratio (total liabilities divided by total assets) to 





D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e  E m p r e s a s
The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total liabilities 
(EBITDA/TL) ratio measures a company’s ability to repay debt obligations from 
annualized operating cash flow. This ratio is a common metric used by credit rating 
agencies to assess the probability of defaulting on issued debt. A low EBITDA/TL ratio 
suggests that a firm may not be able to service its debt in an appropriate manner and may 
result in a lowered credit rating. Conversely, a high ratio may suggest that the firm may 
want take on more debt if needed, and it often warrants a relatively high credit rating. We 
hypothesize a negative relationship between the EBITDA/TL ratio and the CDS premium. 
To measure operating performance, we use the asset turnover ratio, which is defined 
as the ratio between net sales and total assets. This ratio helps to measure the effectiveness 
with which the management uses its assets to generate sales or revenue (i.e., the 
productivity of a company’s assets). A high asset turnover ratio is desirable compared to a 
low ratio because the former is indicative of better operating performance. A negative 
relationship between the asset turnover ratio and the firm’s credit risk is expected. If we 
use EBIT instead of net sales in the numerator of the ratio, we obtain a measure of 
profitability that is well known in the literature, i.e., the return on total assets (ROA), 
which is considered an indicator of how effectively a company is using its assets to 
generate earnings before contractual obligations must be paid. Moreover, as is customary 
in the literature (e.g., Arslan and Karan, 2009), a third profitability ratio is constructed as 
net income divided by total assets (NI/TA). Again, a negative relationship between these 
ratios and CDS spreads is expected. 
Finally, because the effect of size on firm’s credit risk seems to be non-linear, we use 
the logarithm of firm assets to accommodate this non-linear relationship. We expect that a 
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2.2.2.2 Market-based variables 
In contrast to accounting models, a market-based approach uses either the market 
value of the firm’s equity or the trading price of its bonds as the main variable to estimate 
the company’s credit risk. The empirical application of models of this type is very recent, 
achieving popularity in recent years. Of the models that are currently being developed in 
this area of analysis, a particularly notable one is KMV Corporation’s (acquired by 
Moody’s) structural type model. As previously stated, its theoretical inspiration is 
Merton’s (1974) model. Merton (1974) considers the equity of a firm as a European-type 
call option on its assets, with the strike price being the accounting value of the outstanding 
debt due for repayment in the defined time horizon.  
We will now provide a brief exposition of the theoretical base of the model. Let us 
consider a leveraged firm that has only issued debt consisting of a zero-coupon bond with 
maturity T. Moreover, there are no issues of any type of security during the life of the debt 
contract. This company does not pay dividends. We also assume that markets are perfect 
and that there are no frictions, such as taxes or bankruptcy costs.10 In this case, the market 
value of the firm’s equity, E, at maturity T is given by: 
ET =max (VT – D, 0)                                                         (1) 
where VT is the market value of the company’s assets and D is the book value of the debt at 
maturity. According to this equation, if the debt payment is not made, the bondholders 
receive the value of the firm, and equity holders receive nothing. However, if the asset 
                                                 
10  Other assumptions considered by the model are as follows: (1) every individual acts as if he can buy or sell 
as much of any security as he wishes without affecting the market price; (2) there is a riskless asset, whose 
rate of return is known and constant over time; (3) trading takes place continuously, and individuals may 
take short positions in any security, including the riskless asset; and (4) the dynamics for the value of the 
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value is higher than the face value of the debt, the equity holders, as residual claimers, 
receive the difference between these two values. It should be noted that (1) represents the 
payment of a European call option on the value of the firm with strike price D. Therefore, 
we can use the formulation of Black and Scholes (1973) to determine the probability that 
the company will default.  
According to the general assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, we can 
relate the market value of the firm’s equity at time 0, E0, with the market value of the 
assets, V0, and the volatility of the return on these assets, σV, using the known expressions 





























                            (2) 
where N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, r is the 
risk-free interest rate in continuous time, and the remaining variables are as defined above. 
It can be observed that the model has two unknowns, V0 and σV. To estimate these 
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This equation, together with the previous ones shown in (2), makes it possible to 
determine V0 and σV by means of a numerical algorithm using the values of E0 and σE; 
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The neutral-risk probability that the value of the company is greater than the value of 
the debt on the date T, i.e., VT ≥ D, is N(d2). We can also calculate the natural default 
probability, but the expected rate of growth of the company, µ, is required. In this case, the 
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Having estimated the probability of default of the firm using equation (4), it is easy 
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Default occurs when the ratio of the value of assets to debt is less than 1 or when its 
log is negative. The preceding equation tells us by how many standard deviations the log of 
this ratio must deviate from its mean for default to occur. Because a company with a higher 
DtD has a lower probability of insolvency (and vice versa), we expect a negative 
relationship between this variable and the CDS spread. DtD has been widely used in the 
literature as a market-based variable for estimating credit risk (e.g., Das et al., 2009; 
Demirovic and Thomas, 2007)  
We make the following assumptions to obtain the DtD. E0 (the market value of 
equity) is computed as the market capitalization during the month of December, whereas 
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prior year of stock price returns.11 We consider t = 0 and T = 1. Similar to previous studies 
(e.g., Du and Suo, 2007; Vassalou and Xing, 2004), we assume that the amount of debt or 
default point D is equal to the book value of the current liabilities plus half of the long-
term debt. We use the 1-year constant maturity Treasury rate as the risk-free rate r. Finally, 
µ is a proxy for the real GDP growth rate for n + 1 years.  
In addition to the DtD, we consider other common market-based variables, such as 
the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, which is a measure of the price paid for a share relative to 
the annual net income per share. Therefore, the P/E ratio can alternatively be calculated by 
dividing the company’s market capitalization by its total annual earnings. This ratio is 
normally used for valuation: a higher P/E ratio means that investors are paying more for 
each unit of net income, so the stock is more expensive compared to one with a lower P/E 
ratio. We can thus expect a negative relationship between the P/E ratio and the firm’s 
credit risk. Similar considerations could be made for the price-to-cash flow (P/C) ratio. 
Finally, the price-to-book (P/B) ratio is the inverse of the known BM (book-to-market) 
ratio. Vassalou and Xing (2004) find that the BM ratio has a significant relationship with 
default risk; small firms with a high BM ratio tend to have a high default risk, whereas 
large firms with a low BM ratio are likely to have a low credit risk. Therefore, we predict a 
negative sign for the P/B ratio in our equation. 
2.2.2.3 Control variables 
To account for country-specific and industry-specific effects, we include country and 
industry dummies, respectively. The country dummy variables must capture differences in, 
                                                 
11 We also consider the annualized standard deviation of equity returns σE as a specific independent variable, 
which allows for testing the effect of the volatility of the equity market in isolation. Higher equity volatility 
often implies higher asset volatility, leading firm value to be more likely to fall below the default threshold 
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for example, the institutional framework, the degree of competition, and the accounting 
standards among the European countries. However, the industry dummies must control for 
differences among the industries considered (basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, health care, industrials, oil and gas, utilities, and telecommunications). In 
addition, we include a set of year dummies to account for macroeconomic conditions and 
time-specific effects.12 
Finally, we control for maturity in years of the CDS contract. We hypothesize a 
positive relationship between the CDS maturity and the credit risk; i.e., the longer the 
maturity of the contract, the higher the CDS premium.  
Table 3 summarizes the explanatory variables and their expected signs as considered 
in the present study.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on the accounting and market-based determinants 
of CDS spreads. In this table, every given company is represented as many times as CDS 
premiums are available for that firm. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
2.3. Methodology 
Following the same procedure used by Das et al. (2009) for the U.S. market, we 
estimate the following three multivariate empirical models for the European market: (1) an 
accounting-based multivariate model of the determinants of credit spreads, compared in in 
                                                 
12 Because we are only interested in knowing which firm-specific variables (accounting- or market-based) are 
better determinants of credit risk, we chose to include year dummies to control for all macroeconomic 
variables. A detailed analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of credit risk is provided by Bonfim 
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terms of explanatory power with (2) a model that uses market information and (3) a 
comprehensive model that includes both accounting- and market-based information. 
2.3.1. Accounting-based model (Model 1) 
We estimate the following linear regression:  
Yi,t = β1 · CL/CAi,t + β2 · WC/TAi,t + β3 · RE/TAi,t + β4 · TL/Eqi,t + β5 · Coveragei,t + 
β6 · EBITDA/TLi,t + β7 · Turnoveri,t + β8 · ROAi,t + β9 · NI/TAi,t + β10 · Sizei,t + β11 · 
Maturityi,t + β12 · Industry (dummy)i,t + β13 · Country (dummy)i,t + β14 · Year (dummy)i,t + 
εi,t.                      (6) 
Here, subscripts i and t index firms and time in years, respectively; Y denotes the 
dependent variable, which is the natural log of the CDS spread at the end of the year. As 
stated above, we consider 10 firm-specific accounting variables and several additional 
dummy variables to account for the industry, the country, and the macroeconomic 
environment. Finally, we control for the maturity of the CDS contract. The notations of 
these explanatory variables are described in Table 3. εi,t is the disturbance, which contains 
the unobserved firm-specific effect (ηi) and the idiosyncratic error (νi,t).  
2.3.2. Market-based model (Model 2) 
We now estimate the following linear regression:  
Yi,t = β1 · DtDi,t + β2 · σEi,t + β3 · P/Ei,t + β4 · P/Ci,t + β5 · P/Bi,t + β6 · Maturityi,t + β7 · 
Industry (dummy)i,t + β8 · Country (dummy)i,t + β9 · Year (dummy)i,t + εi,t.               (7) 
Again, subscripts i and t index firms and time in years, respectively; Y denotes the 
dependent variable, which is the natural log of the CDS spread at the end of the year. We 
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for the industry, the country, and the macroeconomic environment. Finally, we control for 
the maturity of the CDS contract. The notations of these explanatory variables are 
described in Table 3. εi,t is the disturbance, which contains the unobserved firm-specific 
effect (ηi) and the idiosyncratic error (νi,t).  
2.3.3. Comprehensive model (Model 3) 
Finally, our third model attempts to determine whether market-based measures add 
any value if used in combination with accounting measures. Therefore, the linear 
regression is as follows: 
Yi,t = β1 · CL/CAi,t + β2 · WC/TAi,t + β3 · RE/TAi,t + β4 · TL/Eqi,t + β5 · Coveragei,t + 
β6 · EBITDA/TLi,t + β7 · Turnoveri,t + β8 · ROAi,t + β9 · NI/TAi,t + β10 · Sizei,t + β11 · DtD,t + 
β12 · σEi,t + β13 · P/Ei,t + β14 · P/Ci,t + β15 · P/Bi,t + β16 · Maturityi,t + β17 · Industry (dummy)i,t 
+ β18 · Country (dummy)i,t + β19 · Year (dummy)i,t + εi,t.                         (8) 
As stated above, Y denotes the dependent variable, which is the natural log of the 
CDS spread for firm i at the end of year t. Model 3 considers firm-specific accounting- and 
market-based variables as well as additional variables to account for the industry, the 
country, the macroeconomic environment, and the maturity of the CDS contract.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Univariate analysis 
As a first approximation, we perform a univariate analysis of the sample. We 
calculate the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the natural log of the CDS spread 
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
As seen, the highest correlations with the CDS premium correspond to two of the 
market-based variables, the DtD (-0.54 on average) and the annualized standard deviation 
of equity returns (0.62 on average), both of which have the predicted signs. This result 
suggests that market-based variables play an important role in explaining credit risk. In 
addition, we can see that the correlation of the CDS spread with these two variables 
decreases as CDS maturity increases, from -0.68 to -0.54 for the DtD and from 0.74 to 0.62 
for the equity volatility, for a maturity of 1- and 30-year, respectively.  
Table 5 also shows that the accounting-based variables used for measuring debt 
service and firm profitability have the highest correlations with CDS spreads (-0.21 for 
Coverage; -0.19 and -0.18 for NI/TA and ROA, respectively). However, the CL/CA ratio 
and the variable that captures the firm’s size show lower correlation coefficients, both of 
which are close to zero. 
 
3.2. Multivariate analysis 
After univariate analysis, we conduct a regression analysis.13 Table 6 reports our 
results for the three credit risk models considered.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
In the accounting-based equation (Model 1), we find that all the variables considered 
have the expected sign. The WC/TA ratio shows a negative and statistically significant 
                                                 
13 First, however, we perform an analysis of multicollinearity for the previously selected independent 
variables. A study of the matrix of correlations indicates that most of the coefficients of bivariate 
correlation are lower than 0.65. We subsequently confirm that collinearity would not be a problem by 
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relationship with CDS spreads, meaning that lower liquidity implies higher credit risk. In 
past studies (e.g., Altman, 1968), this ratio has also been found to be a significant indicator 
of corporate problems.  
The two variables that measure the effect of capital structure on credit risk (RE/TA 
and TL/Eq ratios) show a strong relationship with CDS spreads. Firms with higher retained 
earnings relative to total assets are expected to have lower credit risk levels due to older 
age and less leverage. Similarly, a higher value of TL/Eq implies greater leverage and thus 
a higher probability of default. 
Corroborating our univariate results, we find a strong negative relationship between 
the interest coverage ratio and CDS spreads. Therefore, the CDS premium declines as the 
firm’s EBIT relative to total interest payments increases. Nevertheless, we do not find the 
EBITDA/TL ratio to be a statistically significant driver of credit risk. 
As expected, the regression coefficients show a negative relationship between 
profitability measures and corporate credit risk. However, only the coefficient of the 
NI/TA ratio is statistically significant (at the 5% level). Finally, as with our univariate 
results, we do not find size to be a determinant of CDS spreads. 
Similar to Das et al.’s (2009) findings, the explanatory power of our accounting-
based model is high, explaining 67.42% of the variation in our sample of CDS spreads. 
Model 2 (market-based) supports the results found by the univariate analysis. Both 
distance-to-default and the annualized standard deviation of equity returns are statistically 
significant (at the 1% level), and the signs are as predicted. A higher value of DtD and a 
lower equity volatility imply lower credit risk. The P/E, P/C, and P/B ratios produce no 
significant association with the CDS spreads. However, the coefficient sign of P/E ratio is 
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effects on CDS spreads: a high P/E ratio implies high future asset growth, reducing the 
likelihood of financial distress, but high-growth firms tend to have high return volatilities, 
which increase credit risk. The explanatory power of this second model is slightly higher 
than the accounting-based model, with an R2 of 68.41% versus 67.42% in the latter 
equation.  
Model 3 includes both accounting- and market-based variables for explaining credit 
risk. Most of the explanatory variables retain the same signs and the same statistical 
significances. Nevertheless, the WC/TA and the NI/TA ratio lose some statistical 
significance, while the P/E ratio and the P/B ratio are now statistically significant (at the 
10% and 1% level, respectively). 
The coefficient of determination R2 improves from 67.42% (Model 1) and 68.41% 
(Model 2) to 72.76%, suggesting that both accounting and market data complement one 
other. Therefore, a comprehensive model including both types of variables appears to be 
the best option for explaining credit risk. This finding is in accordance with results found 
by Agarwall and Taffler (2008) and Das et al. (2009) for the U.K. and the U.S. markets, 
respectively. 
 
3.3. Robustness checks 
To further confirm the aforementioned findings, we conduct a number of robustness 
checks. First, we split the sample into two periods: a pre-crisis period (from 2002 to 2006) 
and a crisis period (from 2007 to 2009). By doing this, we investigate the possible impact 
of the recent financial crisis on our credit risk models. Although our results do not change 
(see Table 7) in that a comprehensive model including both types of variables remains the 
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periods (before and during the crisis) with respect to the explanatory power of models and 
the statistical significance of some explanatory variables. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
In relation to the explanatory power of models, we find that it is considerably higher 
during the crisis period. This finding is consistent with that reported by other authors such 
as Chiaramonte and Casu (2012) and Annaert et al. (2010) for the banking industry. The 
former study suggests that the explanatory power during the pre-crisis period is lower 
because CDS spreads were flat at that time. With respect to the explanatory variables, 
although most of them remain unchanged in terms of signs and levels of significance, we 
do observe that liquidity ratios appear to play an important role as determinants of default 
risk during periods of crisis. Something similar happens with the P/C ratio. Investors seem 
to value positively greater liquidity in times of crisis, reducing the premium paid for 
eventual default among companies with better liquidity ratios. Finally, we find a little 
difference in the variable that measures the effect of size on credit risk. This variable is 
positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in the accounting-based model for the 
crisis period, which may suggest that a larger size could have implied higher levels of 
credit risk during this period. 
Second, we perform a robustness check to analyze how the maturity of the CDS 
contract affects our results (see Table 8). We consider only 1-, 5-, and 30-year CDS spread 
data. Our main finding remains unalterable; that is, the comprehensive model still provides 
the greatest explanatory power for all maturities considered. However, we find that the 
coefficient of determination R2 decreases as the maturity increases (from 87.80% to 
70.11% for the comprehensive model and for 1-year and 30-year CDS contracts, 
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different maturities may have different levels of liquidity, which may be reflected in their 
quoted spreads.14 Second, it has been long recognized in the literature that a critical 
component of systematic economic risk may be missing in credit risk modeling (e.g., 
Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001). Wang et al. (2011) report that this component increases with 
the maturity of the CDS contract. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
Third, we evaluate the method of estimation used in the analysis. Because panel data 
are used, we can re-estimate the models with fixed or random effects. Because the 
Hausman test suggests that the fixed effects estimator is more appropriate in our case, we 
report these results in Table 9.15 By doing this, we assume that omitted variables may 
potentially correlate with the existing regressors (e.g., CDS liquidity, corporate 
governance, etc.). As expected, the comprehensive model has the greatest explanatory 
power. Moreover, we re-estimate our base equations with only the variables that are 
statically significant. Again, most of the explanatory variables retain both their signs and 
their statistical significance. However, we do observe some loss of explanatory power, as 
shown by the coefficients of determination (64.30%, 68.04% and 70.51% for Models 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively).16  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
                                                 
14 CDS contracts may not be significantly affected by liquidity due to their contractual nature, which allows 
negotiating large notional amounts compared to the corporate bond market; hence, CDS spreads may better 
illustrate a default risk premium (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005). However, Pan and Singleton (2007) suggest a 
liquidity factor as a possible cause of higher CDS spreads. 
15 We use only the most liquid 5-year CDS contract. 
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Finally, we replace the DtD with the probability of default, as defined in (4). Both 
the sign (positive) and the statistical significance are as expected. This new model 
specification is able to explain 68.14% (Model 2) and 71.01% (Model 3) of the variance in 
the logarithm of CDS spreads. 
3.4. Are there differences in using credit ratings instead of CDS spreads? 
Credit ratings have also been used as a typical proxy for credit risk in the literature 
(e.g., Demirovic and Thomas, 2007). However, rating agencies have been questioned as 
effective evaluators of credit risk by regulators and investors, particularly after the 2007 
subprime crisis. A key criticism is that issuers must pay the credit ratings agencies to rate 
their securities, which may lead to conflicts of interests. Another important concern with 
the ratings agencies refers to their slowness to adapt their measurements to changes in the 
firm´s financial and economic conditions (e.g., Enron’s debt was rated investment grade 
four days before the company went bankrupt) or to their recent errors of judgment in rating 
structured products such as mortgage-backed securities. All of the above would involve 
considering the credit rating as a noisy measure of credit risk. 
Because these credit ratings are inherently ordered, we now use an ordered logistic 
regression for modeling the relationship between the credit risk and both the accounting 
and the market-based data. We use discrete values of credit ratings as a dependent variable; 
i.e., we convert the ratings provided by the agencies into numerical groupings: from 1 for 
the best ratings to 7 for ratings of BBB- or lower. Table 10 reports the credit rating 
provided by the three major international rating agencies (Standard & Poor´s, Moody´s and 
Fitch) for the sample firms over the 2002-2009 period as well as the assigned numerical 
values. Each company is assigned the rating it has at the end of the year. If the company is 
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observation. In total, we have 706 observations for 51 unique firms listed in the 
FTSEurofirst 100 index. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
Our results (see Table 11) are very similar to those found when using the CDS spread 
as the proxy for credit risk. Again, a comprehensive model including both accounting and 
market data has the greatest explanatory power (22.82%). However, our results indicate 
that when the credit rating is used as the credit risk measure, accounting data play a more 
important role than market data in explaining a firm´s creditworthiness (the accounting-
based model explains 20.58% of the variability, whereas the market-based model explains 
only 14.45%). The same conclusion is reached by Demirovic and Thomas (2007) for the 
UK market. Finally, with regard to the explanatory variables, although most of them 
remain unaffected in terms of their sign and level of significance, we do observe that 
liquidity ratios now appear to be more important drivers of default risk and that equity 
volatility loses much of its explanatory power. We also find that the variable that measures 
the effect of size on credit risk is positive and strongly statistically significant, suggesting 
that a greater the size is associated with a higher rating.   
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
 
4. Conclusions  
Using a sample of 2,186 credit default swap (CDS) spreads taken from the European 
market during the period 2002-2009, this paper empirically analyzes which model – 
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We find little difference in the explanatory power of each approach. Our results 
suggest that both accounting and market data are complementary to one other. Therefore, a 
comprehensive model including both types of variables appears to be the best option for 
explaining credit risk. This finding is in accordance with results reported by Agarwall and 
Taffler (2008) and Das et al. (2009) for the U.K. and the U.S. markets, respectively. 
We also show that the explanatory power of accounting- and market-based variables 
for measuring credit risk is particularly strong during periods of high uncertainty, as 
experienced in the recent financial crisis, and that it decreases as the CDS contract matures. 
Although the former may be because CDS spreads become more sensitive during periods 
of crisis and thus act as better credit risk indicators, the latter may be due to either 
differences in liquidity, which are not captured by our model, or a component of systematic 
economic risk that is greater for longer CDS maturities. 
Finally, when the credit rating is used as a proxy for credit risk, our main conclusion 
is unchanged; i.e., the best results are reached when accounting and market data are taken 
together. Nevertheless, our results suggest that accounting variables play a more important 
role than market variables in explaining credit ratings. 
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Table 1. Number of observations 
Our sample consists of 2,186 CDS spreads for the 2002-2009 period from 51 unique firms listed in the 
FTSEurofirst 100 Index. Firms operating in the financial sector are excluded from the analysis. Entities that 
present abnormal ratios or extreme values are also eliminated from the sample as outliers. We obtained CDS 
spread information from the Markit database. Accounting data were obtained from the Amadeus database, 
whereas market data were taken from the Datastream database. 
 
 CDS maturities 
Year 1 2 3 5 10 15 30 All maturities 
2002 28 28 28 28 28 25 12 177 
2003 34 35 35 35 35 34 30 238 
2004 38 39 39 39 39 38 38 270 
2005 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 287 
2006 42 42 43 43 43 43 43 299 
2007 47 47 47 47 47 46 45 326 
2008 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 322 
2009 39 39 39 39 39 39 33 267 
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Table 2. CDS spread descriptive statistics 
Our sample consists of 2,186 CDS spreads for the 2002-2009 period from 51 unique firms listed in the Eurofirst 100 
Index. CDS spreads were obtained from the Markit database as the average of the last 10 trading days at the end of each 
year. Statistics are shown by year, by CDS maturity, and for the full sample. CDS spreads are in basis points. 
 
  CDS maturities 
  1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year 15-Year 30-Year 
All  
maturities 
2002 Mean 71 75 81 88 99 110 126 89 
 Median 49 56 60 69 81 93 100 70 
 Max. 261 242 247 231 233 236 265 265 
 Min. 12 14 16 20 27 33 58 12 
 St. Dev. 57 56 57 56 57 58 69 59 
2003 Mean 43 55 62 66 76 81 52 62 
 Median 15 20 27 34 42 49 50 34 
 Max. 781 1034 1112 986 950 950 102 1112 
 Min. 4 8 8 11 13 14 10 4 
 St. Dev. 132 172 184 162 154 156 21 149 
2004 Mean 15 22 30 45 66 70 74 46 
 Median 9 15 20 31 49 52 53 31 
 Max. 118 180 226 299 341 342 353 353 
 Min. 3 5 7 10 19 15 18 3 
 St. Dev. 21 29 37 50 57 59 61 52 
2005 Mean 12 19 27 43 68 73 76 45 
 Median 8 14 20 35 58 65 66 36 
 Max. 48 78 109 166 222 227 214 227 
 Min. 3 5 6 9 18 18 24 3 
 St. Dev. 8 14 20 31 41 42 43 40 
2006 Mean 7 12 17 29 51 59 63 34 
 Median 7 11 15 27 50 58 59 26 
 Max. 19 32 50 82 130 138 139 139 
 Min. 1 2 2 4 7 9 20 1 
 St. Dev. 4 7 10 16 26 28 27 29 
2007 Mean 26 33 40 51 67 74 92 54 
 Median 23 31 37 47 64 71 84 48 
 Max. 83 88 89 95 119 127 312 312 
 Min. 3 5 6 9 15 19 25 3 
 St. Dev. 13 14 16 18 22 23 44 32 
2008 Mean 323 328 319 299 274 271 274 298 
 Median 201 217 216 203 193 197 198 206 
 Max. 1691 1673 1625 1530 1387 1163 1155 1691 
 Min. 34 81 82 80 68 74 63 34 
 St. Dev. 302 291 281 271 254 233 229 266 
2009 Mean 42 56 68 87 103 104 113 81 
 Median 38 49 60 76 91 94 102 72 
 Max. 104 134 160 195 215 219 222 222 
 Min. 22 27 32 41 49 46 52 22 
 St. Dev. 16 25 30 38 42 43 46 43 
Mean 71 79 84 91 103 108 112 92 All 
years Median 21 28 36 49 68 74 79 52 
 Max. 1691 1673 1625 1530 1387 1163 1155 1691 
 Min. 1 2 2 4 7 9 10 1 
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Table 3. Explanatory variables and expected signs 
Explanatory Variables Notation Classification Expected signs 
Accounting variables    
Current Liabilities/Current Assets CL/CA Liquidity + 
Working Capital/Total Assets WC/TA Liquidity - 
Retained Earnings/Total Assets RE/TA Capital structure - 
Total Liabilities/Equity TL/Eq Capital structure + 
Interest Coverage ratio Coverage Debt service - 
EBITDA/Total Liabilities EBITDA/TL Cash flow generation - 
Net Assets Turnover ratio Turnover Performance (Profitability) - 
Return on Assets ROA Performance (Profitability) - 
Net Income/Total Assets NI/TA Performance (Profitability) - 
Total Assets, logarithm Size Size - 
Market-based variables    
Distance to Default DtD Default risk - 
Annualized equity volatility σE Market risk + 
Price-to-earnings ratio P/E Market multiple - 
Price-to-cash flow ratio P/C Market multiple - 
Price-to-book ratio P/B Market multiple - 
Control Variables    
Maturity of CDS contract  
(1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 30 years) 
Maturity Contract-specific variable + 
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Table 4. Summary statistics on firm-specific variables 
This table shows the summary statistics for the accounting and market-based variables considered in our 

















Accounting Variables  
CL/CA 2186 1.4817 1.7501 0.7293 1.0338 1.5082 
WC/TA 2186 0.0419 0.0715 -0.0011 0.0100 0.0764 
RE/TA 2186 0.3496 0.1668 0.2331 0.3342 0.4781 
TL/Eq 2186 1.9704 7.5218 0.8267 1.4869 2.5090 
Coverage 2186 3.7065 7.1857 0 1.0039 4.9151 
EBITDA/TL 2186 0.1355 0.1502 0.0036 0.1117 0.2310 
Turnover 2186 0.7295 0.7840 0.0746 0.5484 1.0099 
ROA 2186 0.0632 0.0739 0.0238 0.0571 0.0924 
NI/TA 2186 0.0584 0.0715 0.0258 0.0521 0.0805 
Size 2186 5.9010 1.4507 4.5456 5.2073 7.3399 
Market-based Variables  
DtD 2186 6.7307 3.2357 3.9615 6.4877 8.8012 
σE 2186 0.3160 0.1618 0.2030 0.2681 0.4020 
P/E 2186 15.5391 15.9912 9.8900 13.4000 17.6200 
P/C 2186 8.1097 11.4707 4.9200 7.3450 9.9700 
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Table 5. Univariate analysis 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the log of CDS spreads and the firm-specific 
variables (accounting- and market-based) sorted by CDS maturity. *Signifies a correlation significantly 
different from 0 (5% level). 
 
 CDS maturities 
 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year 15-Year 30-Year 
All 
Years 
Accounting Variables        
CL/CA 0.0150 0.0348 0.0002 0.0101 0.0042 0.0028 0.0348 0.0136 
WC/TA -0.1133* -0.1246* -0.1265* -0.1352* -0.1400* -0.1329* -0.1529* -0.1155* 
RE/TA -0.0645 -0.0759 -0.0792 -0.0826 -0.0920 -0.0985 -0.0733 -0.0723* 
TL/Eq 0.0460 0.0543 0.0537 0.0537 0.0556 0.0613 0.0502 0.0492* 
Coverage -0.1884* -0.2223* -0.2363* -0.2569* -0.2619* -0.2622* -0.2575* -0.2111* 
EBITDA/TL -0.1276* -0.1348* -0.1356* -0.1340* -0.1162* -0.1080 -0.1097 -0.1091* 
Turnover -0.0802 -0.0919 -0.0912 -0.0914 -0.0933 -0.0877 -0.0553 -0.0745* 
ROA -0.2123* -0.2219* -0.2220* -0.2165* -0.2069* -0.1994* -0.1529* -0.1809* 
NI/TA -0.2357* -0.2371* -0.2375* -0.2276* -0.2153* -0.2035* -0.1629* -0.1939* 
Size 0.0216 0.0265 0.0406 0.0428 0.0573 0.0515 0.0576 0.0359 
        
Market-based Variables        
DtD -0.6816* -0.6638* -0.6499* -0.6164* -0.5426* -0.5454* -0.5303* -0.5461* 
σE 0.7362* 0.7363* 0.7302* 0.7091* 0.6598* 0.6568* 0.6223* 0.6211* 
P/E -0.0904 -0.0862 -0.0794 -0.0689 -0.0618 -0.0658 -0.0475 -0.0679* 
P/C -0.0621 -0.0651 -0.0632 -0.0644 -0.0607 -0.0488 -0.0490 -0.0528* 
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Table 6. Comparative analysis of credit risk models 
This table reports linear regressions of the log of CDS spreads to accounting measures (Model 1), market-
based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. Robust standard 
errors, which are clustered by firms, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: 







































































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering level Firm Firm Firm 
N 2,186 2,186 2,186 
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Table 7. Comparative analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002-2006) and the crisis period 
(2007-2009) 
This table reports linear regressions of the log of CDS spreads to accounting measures (Model 1), market-
based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3) for the pre-crisis period (2002-2006) and the crisis period 
(2007-2009). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. Robust standard errors, which are clustered by 
firms, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***= significant at the 1% 
level, **= significant at the 5% level, and *= significant at the 10% level. 
 














































































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering 
level 
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 1,271 1,271 1,271 915 915 915 
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Table 8. Credit risk models grouped by CDS maturity 
This table reports linear regressions of the log of CDS spreads to accounting measures (Model 1), market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3), grouped by maturity of the CDS 
contract (1-, 5- and 30-years). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. Robust standard errors, which are clustered by firms, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, and *= significant at the 10% level. 
 


























































































































































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 315 315 315 318 318 318 288 288 288 
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Table 9. Fixed effects model 
This table reports fixed effects model of the log of 5-year CDS spreads to accounting measures (Model 1), 
market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***= significant at 
































































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering level Firm Firm Firm 
N 318 318 318 
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Table 10. Credit rating conversion 
This table presents the credit rating of the 51 firms that compose our sample provided by the three major 
international rating agencies (Standard & Poor´s, Moody´s and Fitch) for the 2002-2009 period as well as the 
numerical value assigned to each rating. When a company is rated by more than one of the agencies in any 
year, each rating is considered as a separate observation. Rating data were obtained from Bloomberg. 
 
Rating    






AAA Aaa AAA 1   
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 1 66 9,35% 
AA Aa2 AA 1   
AA- Aa3 AA- 1   
A+ A1 A+ 2 109 15,44% 
A A2 A 3 62 8,78% 
A- A3 A- 4 152 21,53% 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 5 224 31,73% 
BBB Baa2 BBB 6 72 10,20% 
BBB- or lower Baa3 or lower BBB- or lower 7 21 2,97% 
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Table 11. Comparative analysis using credit ratings 
This table reports ordered logistic regressions of the long-term credit ratings provided by the three major 
international rating agencies (Standard & Poor´s, Moody´s and Fitch) to accounting measures (Model 1), 
market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). See Table 10 for the numerical values assigned to the 
credit ratings. See Table 3 for a description of the independent variables. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at 























































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Agency dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 706 706 706 
Pseudo R2 20.58% 14.45% 22.82% 
 
 
